The lesson of Fukushima:
Nuclear, suicidal, manual
March 14, April 13, 2011
April 13, 2011:
We have been able to read, see below,
the interview
of Thierry Charles,
Director of the French Institute for Radioprotection
and Nuclear Safety
by journalist Antoine Bouthier, on
April 12, 2011, for the newspaper
Le Monde. Open your eyes wide, read and reread. Despite the spectacular deterioration we have observed in high-resolution photos taken from a drone (a small private Japanese company), everything can be recovered. The situation is under control. In a few weeks or months, all that will be needed is a good wash and a thorough overhaul, and residents will be able to return home. I'm not making this up. Read it for yourselves.
"
The worst is over...
We found some highly radioactive puddles beneath the plant, possibly due to small leaks under the pools...
The fuel had partially melted and there were cooling losses, which could be easily managed...
Engineers are advancing slowly and they are right to take their time. In addition, they have successfully supplied water to the reactors without problems...
Before the entire system can be restarted,
it is necessary to verify all electrical circuits, pumps, and the water in the pools, which may be full of debris and salt crusts. This verification could take several weeks or even months...
Iodine-131 is a radioactive element with a relatively short half-life, and its radioactivity decreases by a factor of two each week.
Within three months, its level will be completely secondary,
and residents could theoretically return...
Once the cooling system is operational and there is no longer a need to add water to the pools, the work will not yet be finished. They will have to clean the entire site, remove the fuel, and protect the plant from the wind...
Now compare the content of this article from Le Monde:
Source:
http://www.independentwho.info/Presse_ecrite/11_03_26_LeMonde.fr_FR.pdf
Tokyo, reported by correspondents of this newspaper:
Misled by authorities, increasingly aware of the catastrophe they are facing, and for the vast majority unable to assess the gravity of the situation, the Japanese people are deeply anxious—and rightly so. Thanks to testimonies from nuclear experts broadcast on private television networks or blogs, a repulsive "black hand" has emerged in the press: what is politely called the "nuclear lobby."
A wealthy and powerful entity, with its nerve center located at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which controls nuclear policy, and whose branches include the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), industrial groups that build nuclear plants—Toshiba and Hitachi at the forefront—and plant operators.
This lobby, which sees former senior officials from ministries and agencies linked to nuclear activity "working" for power companies, is a master at concealing information.
It funds major advertising campaigns in newspapers and on television to ensure that nuclear energy is perfectly safe.
The 2009 rise to power of a new political majority has not changed the landscape, since the Democratic Party (DPJ) relies on the powerful labor confederation Rengo, where one of the main actors is the branch representing workers in the energy sector, deeply aligned with nuclear interests. This massive collusion between high administration, control agents, plant builders, and operators silences opponents while eliminating any questioning or criticism of nuclear energy.
It is not for lack of evidence—supported by documents—of negligence, omissions, or outright falsifications. These actions led in 2002 to charges against ten power companies for concealing incidents from the 1970s, when nuclear power was beginning to expand across the Japanese archipelago. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), owner and operator of the Fukushima plants, was at the top of the list.
This time, there are testimonies—called upon to be verified and put into context—from former TEPCO employees. However, for now, the raw information from these revelations sends chills down one's spine. If they truly reflect reality, it appears that operators—certainly TEPCO, but also their counterparts—prioritized short-term profitability over long-term safety imperatives.
Or at best, they did not sufficiently account for the risk in a country with significant seismic activity and tsunamis.
The Fukushima plants were designed to withstand a 5.5-meter wave based on the Chilean tsunami of 1956...
The reactors survived the earthquake and shut down automatically, but the cooling system, insufficiently protected, stopped working. Two Toshiba engineers who had participated in designing the Fukushima plant, quoted by the Tokyo Shimbun newspaper, estimate that a "low risk threshold" was used in calculating predictions.
Textually, the economy minister has acknowledged that “once the crisis situation is under control, we will have to examine TEPCO’s management.”
Certainly, but in the meantime, how many victims will there be? An anonymous former Toshiba engineer is more direct: “Japan is not facing a natural disaster but a man-made catastrophe.”
A long article published in the Wall Street Journal reiterates data presented by Hidekatsu Yoshi, a Communist Party deputy and former nuclear engineer, who demonstrated in a 2010 book based on NISA documents that the Fukushima nuclear plant has experienced the highest number of incidents in all of Japan—about fifteen accidents between 2005 and 2009—and that its employees have been exposed to radiation more than any other group over the past decade. It is also said that subcontractors, generally inexperienced, were used for plant maintenance, paying a heavy price in the fight against the catastrophe.
TEPCO’s delayed response is also under scrutiny.
“TEPCO realized the danger too slowly,” declared a senior official to the Kyodo news agency. In the first two days after the earthquake and tsunami, concern for preserving equipment seemed more important than assessing risks to the population.
The eight Areva employees—France’s leading global nuclear energy company—who were present at the site during the quake quickly grasped the danger and were among the first to evacuate.
Areva has never shown any concern about the risks posed by its client TEPCO’s nuclear plants.
Philippe Mesmer and Philippe Pons
You can compare these two contradictory articles. Moreover, it is easy
to obtain large amounts of information from official Japanese reports. I won’t detail them here as it would take too long, and they are readily available online. But if you think the information I provide here is “biased,” please consult those reports.
Everyone can perceive the cacophony emanating from the Fukushima disaster. While we hear reassuring statements (like those from IRSN, which oddly echo Professor Pellerin’s 1986 comments on Chernobyl’s radioactive cloud) that “doses do not exceed... etc,” we read that Japan’s Nuclear Safety Authority has raised the incident’s severity level to 7—quantitatively comparable to Chernobyl.
The exclusion zone around the plant has been expanded from 20 to 30 km. The level of radioactivity surrounding the facilities makes work increasingly difficult. A strategy based on using robots should have been implemented immediately. Lack of foresight is particularly striking in a country we once considered a leader in this domain.
It is difficult to analyze the behavior of the Japanese population. The general rule is the absence of individual reactions, the impossibility of identifying an individual or group as responsible. The Japanese are “of the group.” For many years, we have been accustomed to employees’ submission to companies, as if members of a social body preferred to ignore the pathological behavior of “their head.” It is time to become aware of a reality: Japan’s nuclear plan has been managed from a profit-oriented perspective, not to meet the needs of its population.
Document on this topic, in English
All possible incompetence has been combined, all kinds of irregularities committed, lies told. The Japanese people do not seem capable of identifying oligarchic responsibility; they prefer to live in a climate of collective responsibility. Above all,
there is a total absence of revolt.
In Tokyo, an anti-nuclear demonstration gathered... one thousand people.
Fatalism and resignation: these two words summarize the Japanese people’s behavior.
http://www.liberation.fr/economie/01012331339-a-iwaki-sous-la-menace-de-l-atome
Japan’s nuclear park, which we wish to continue using due to lack of alternatives, is impossible to improve. We do not know how to dismantle nuclear facilities (their own or ours). We do not know what to do with decades of accumulated waste stored in these “pools.” The world’s third-largest economy is facing a greater crisis, singing the creed of liberalism: “short-term return on investment.” The cost of “reconstruction” conceals the issue of economic choices. The unthinkable has arrived, precisely when we refused to consider that such a thing could happen, and nothing had been prepared—for example, using armored robots (it’s only necessary to shield sensitive parts of devices, primarily their electronics, with lead).
The behavior of Japanese politicians, industrialists, and even more so the population, evokes a human being who, discovering they carry a serious illness, prefers not to see it, lies to themselves, thinks things will fix themselves, and above all refuses to take drastic measures commensurate with the gravity of the situation.
Currently, we do not know whether reactor number 3, loaded with MOX—a French technological marvel that equips twenty of our reactors and contains 7% plutonium—will begin emitting substances of unparalleled danger into the atmosphere.
April 14, 2011:
An article by Christophe Perrais in Agoravox (in French)
MOX and the money of MOX
April 13:
The Japanese NHK network reports that the temperature in the pool of reactor number 4, which contains several tons of “used fuel,” is rising and now reaches 90°C. These elements are submerged under just two meters of water (instead of the usual five). If this level were to drop further, leaving these elements uncooled, radioactive waste contamination of the atmosphere could be expected. This temperature rise reveals that the assemblies are active.
Source:
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/13_35.html
April 13:
TEPCO tries to reassure the public by saying “most of these assemblies (which were exposed to high temperatures when the pools ran dry) ‘have not been damaged.’”
Source:
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/13_37.html
The truth is, they have no idea how extensive the damage is.
In some areas severely affected by the earthquake and aftershocks, deep soil disturbances have occurred, even leading to groundwater appearing at the surface. This curious phenomenon involves “soil liquefaction and fracturing.” The population watches this with great emotion.
Video:
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liqu%C3%A9faction_du_sol
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wi-ka8fhrhQ&feature=related
I saw that Nicolas Hulot (French ecological journalist) had decided to run in the presidential election and was seeking nomination by
the Europe Écologie movement.
A leading figure in media journalism, Hulot could bring change to French politics. However, ecologists must understand that it is impossible to “launch renewable energy projects that are profitable in terms of return on investment.”
The scale of such projects far exceeds the investment capacity of private enterprise and its imperative of short-term profit.
These projects must take the form of
MAJOR WORKS
financed massively by the state, ensuring immediate employment.
This does not mean gradually replacing nuclear power over several decades, but rather addressing the replacement of nuclear and fossil fuels within less than ten years—perhaps even five. For all developed countries, energy needs amount to tens of thousands of megawatts. The solutions, discussed in the May 2011 issue of the Nexus magazine (16 pages), include the development of an immense offshore solar project on floating platforms that, once assembled, would form true cement islands spanning dozens and later hundreds of square kilometers.
Obviously, and in the short term, the cost per kilowatt-hour cannot be compared to current prices. In fact, if we reason in terms of budget, this planetary-scale operation would represent a mobilization of capital, human resources, and raw materials equivalent to the cost of a third world war.
An “Ecological War,” the first one, humanity’s war against its greed and folly.
The question we must ask ourselves is:
How much does a life cost?
(to be continued...) April 11, 2011:
Some readers may have been surprised to see this page changing its title each week. Initially, I titled it “We must get out of this nuclear” because I still had hope that cutting-edge technologies could bring solutions—such as neutron-free fusion (Boron + Hydrogen). This technology represented a fantastic breakthrough achieved in 2006 by Chris Deeney’s team at Sandia Laboratory, New Mexico. This work was later analyzed by British physicist Malcolm Haines, a pioneer in plasma physics. The article, published in 2006 in Physical Review Letters, was titled “Over two billion degrees.” I immediately began working on this article and, a few months later, published a fairly detailed analysis.
In September 2008, I attended a conference in Vilnius (Lithuania) on high-power pulsed systems, where I had a long conversation with Keith Matzen, responsible for the Z machine, where the result published in Physical Review Letters had been achieved. The Z machine was followed by ZR (Z “refurbished”), which operates with currents of around 18 million amperes. My surprise was immense when Matzen and his assistant Mac Kee told me that the aforementioned publication was false and that Haines had made an error in analyzing the spectra.
Why hadn’t Matzen published a correction? “To avoid further discrediting Haines.”
Who would believe such a story?
I asked Gerold Yonas, scientific director of Sandia Laboratories (whom I had met personally in 1976 during a visit to the lab), who replied, “I am concerned about this situation. I will ask Matzen to publish a correction.”
To date, no correction has been made.
In October 2008, Sytgar, who was supposed to present the ZR results at the Korean conference where I was present, said he couldn’t come. The excuse: “His father was very ill.” However, after checking with the organizers, I discovered he had not even registered for the conference. Curious, considering he was one of 18 signatories of the communication and was supposed to present results at the most important international conference on Z machines.
After Oliver from Sandia told the session chair that Sytgar wouldn’t be coming and the chair declared the session closed, Oliver quickly approached me and said I had to stop talking nonsense, that Haines had made a mistake—and that was it. When I asked why and where the error was, Oliver said Sandia “would publish a correction in 2011.”
I’ll bet anything you want that this correction will never appear. Haines did not make an error either in analyzing the experimental data or in his calculations. It is impossible to deny these two aspects; it is impossible to provide scientific arguments capable of destroying this claim.
So then?
The Americans are misleading us, because this result should never have been published. If nuclear fusion that doesn’t contaminate (producing helium atoms as “ashes” of combustion) represents a fantastic hope for humanity, it is also the key to new “pure fusion bombs.” The fusion reaction can be initiated using an MHD (Magneto-Hydrodynamic) compressor, not by an A-bomb (fission bomb), which cannot be miniaturized due to the critical mass problem, imposing a lower limit on fission processes, and which is achieved through explosions equivalent to several hundred tons of TNT.
These compressors were invented by the Russians in the 1950s. I explain all this on my website (&&& I’ll add the links, as I’ve burned a hard drive).
During my trip to Brighton in January 2001, I met Americans working on “black programs.” They left me utterly stunned because the only thing that interested them about UFOs was the possibility of developing new weapons based on new concepts: hypersonic MHD torpedoes, hypersonic aircraft with “MHD-controlled” air intakes.
At the time, the shock was violent. But after this aneutronic fusion incident and its immediate military orientation, I no longer entertain illusions. These bombs can be miniaturized. And therefore... they can be used. Moreover, if a boron-hydrogen formula is chosen, one obtains a… “green bomb.”
This disgusts and depresses me.
I’ll go further. Today’s scientists have no conscience. They are bought for a crust of bread. I recall an issue of the CNRS Mail where Charpentier, then Director of the Department “Physical Sciences for Engineers,” wrote: “The army does not have enough research contracts to satisfy what researchers request.”
We discovered genetic manipulation techniques? After a brief moratorium, here we have GMOs. Researchers develop medicines based on “new molecules,” patented, of course. The World Health Organization launched a vaccination campaign that resulted in vaccinated people contracting diseases. The agro-food industry mixes additives into our food that degrade our health. Agricultural research turns a blind eye to the base motives of fertilizer and sterile seed sellers.
The French Polytechnic engineers from the “Mining Corps” created an atomic empire in France. You can read the internal report
distributed by AREVA, which analyzes “the impact of the Fukushima events on the nuclear power market.”
Soon, we will have nuclear waste in construction materials, packaging, etc.
And in science? Nothing, for decades. Theoretical physicists knit winter socks with superstrings. At CERN’s Geneva Large Hadron Collider (LHC), Higgs boson hunters return with their tails between their legs. In Carache, the nuclear elites promise us the “sun in a test tube,” after launching a 1.5 trillion-euro (10^6) project (ITER), amid technological fog, guaranteeing them a scientific career in an absurd country, at the end of which they can say, “Ah, we were wrong.”
Perhaps they’ll apologize, like Japanese technocrats, to a society paying the price for their unconsciousness and irresponsibility.
The press, media? They are controlled, blind, or deaf. They dedicate articles to “call girls,” prostitutes elevated to stardom by the media. Why not make these girls ministers, since we have ministers who prostitute themselves every day?
Philosophy? Bernard Henry-Ley invented disposable thinking, like an empty bottle. In times when metaphysics is in crisis, café philosophy performs marvelously.
Together with some engineer and technician friends, we are writing an article about exploiting renewable energy. It’s progressing well. Alongside this, it is evident that nuclear power production based on reactors must end, as it has become a murderous madness. We must demand this decision be made now. Only the people, not their corrupt representatives, can make this demand—provided we can offer a “Plan B,” an exit strategy unrelated to the bankrupt projects of our decadent ecologists.
We must demand the immediate halt to “nuclear waste reprocessing” at the La Hague facility, whose goal is recovering residual uranium and plutonium from used fuel mixtures. We must immediately stop producing MOX, nuclear fuel containing 7% of the most dangerous substance ever invented by humanity: plutonium. The French use MOX in 20 of their 58 nuclear reactors. We must stop this mess that is the ITER project. We must cease brandishing nuclear missiles as a deterrent force. We must definitively bury these idiotic projects like so-called Generation IV reactors. Sodium- or lead-cooled fast breeder reactors are suicidal projects.
We must dedicate money, energy, and creativity to projects that improve human living conditions instead of continuously degrading them. For all this, we need to invest a great deal of money, energy, and creativity. Curiously, on this last point, ideas are not lacking.
We must denounce luxury, praise the sobriety of life, and not be dazzled by the richest or most powerful, nor worship golden calves, nor let ourselves be brutalized by their empty ambitions. We must pursue those vain fools who ride in chariots, build 800-meter-tall Babel towers, or construct ski slopes in the middle of deserts, refrigerated with black gold.
How can we not be amazed that so many disadvantaged or confused people turn to old ideologies from several centuries when the only spectacle we offer them is our violence, our injustice, and our chaos?
April 4, 2011: Jonathan Bellocine begins translating this page into English
Update
March 20, 2011
Update
March 27, 2011. IRSN reports from March 25
April 3, 2011: Death under contract
or
Accidents could only be due to human error. That’s what we were told. Gang of liars!
April 9: Kurosawa’s prescient film
April 9, 2011: AREVA’s vertiginous cynicism
I’m setting up benevolent translation workshops for pages like this!
April 12, 2011:
An interview with Thierry Charles, Director of the French Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), conducted for Le Monde by journalist Antoine Bouthier:
Since March 11, Japan has been mired in an unprecedented nuclear crisis.
The Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) now estimates that “the worst is over,” but that it will still take “weeks, or even months” before the situation stabilizes at the plant.
When did you realize how serious this accident was?
We began to worry as soon as the first explosion occurred [24 hours after the earthquake]. Initially, we were considering a scenario similar to Three Mile Island.
The fuel had partially melted, and there were cooling losses, easily manageable...
But when we saw the explosion, we knew there was hydrogen in the containment vessel, and the consequences could be very serious.
How do you assess the situation now?
For ten days, the situation has been roughly stabilized.
Engineers have managed to continuously cool the reactors with fresh water.
We found highly radioactive puddles beneath the plant, possibly due to small leaks under the pools (?...).
But there is an eight-meter-thick concrete layer beneath the reactor, itself built on rock. There is now very little chance that molten material will begin sinking into the ground. Furthermore, the containment building is filled with nitrogen—this is good. It will help prevent hydrogen formation and minimize explosion risks.
The worst is over,
but this is only the beginning of the conquest. The situation will be fully under control when the cooling system is restored.
Engineers are advancing slowly, and they are right to take their time. Especially since they have successfully supplied water to the reactors without problems (?...).
Before restarting the entire system (???),
all electrical circuits, pumps, and water in the pools must be verified—water that may contain debris and salt crusts. This verification could take weeks or even months.
Why has the exclusion zone been expanded?
It has been extended to 30 km. This corresponds to the post-accident zone where radioactive deposits are observed on the ground. We believe this is a reasonable measure. Iodine-131 is a radioactive element with a relatively short half-life, decreasing by a factor of two each week.
In three months, its level will be completely secondary, and residents could theoretically return.
(thus, pollution is linked only to radionuclides with short half-lives)
What do you think of TEPCO’s management?
We must put ourselves in their shoes. They had just suffered a massive natural disaster, potentially losing family members, when they had to face an unprecedented nuclear situation involving multiple damaged reactors simultaneously.
Their main mistake was betting everything on cooling the cores and neglecting the fuel pools at the beginning of the crisis.
With more hindsight, we can analyze how they should have ideally responded (...).
How will authorities shut down the plant?
Once the cooling system is restored and there is no longer a need to continuously add water to the pools, the work will far from be finished. They will need to clean the entire site, remove the fuel, and protect the plant from the wind.
When you look at photos of the site, where several reactors are just tangles of steel and concrete, I would be happy if Mr. Thierry Charles explained how the Japanese plan to “clean the site” and “remove fuel from cores and pools.” How will they access these areas?
They still need to think through the right strategy, which will differ from Chernobyl, where they had to build a sarcophagus.
So, building a sarcophagus is not necessary?
Here, the reactor is not open to the sky. Moreover, we are not immune to another earthquake. We cannot rule out further tremors or new radioactive releases into the atmosphere.
Antoine Bouthier
Simple comment:
Here are photos of the high-capacity concrete cannon leased from Americans (Putzmeister company) by the Japanese, currently being loaded onto a giant Antonov 22 cargo plane on the west coast of the United States, to be transported to Japan.
The super concrete cannon from Putzmeister, loaded into a Russian Antonov 22
Observe, on the right, the rectangular opening where concrete is poured, brought by a “turbine”
These concrete pumps have become extremely common worldwide and allow workers to pour concrete in often inaccessible locations. At the moment I write these lines, a pump of this kind is operating a few hundred meters from my home (Pertuis).
A concrete pump at work in Pertuis, April 11, 2011, Cemex company
Injection hose diameter of this “mini-pump”: 12 cm. Discharge occurs via a series of 8-cubic-meter buckets.
The same, viewed from behind
Close-up on the opening through which the turbine discharges its load
The giant machine, loaded onto the Russian cargo plane, does not appear at first glance to be suitable for water spraying. To do so, the rear of the vehicle would need to be completely modified, it seems to me. I believe the diameter of its discharge funnel is 25 cm, and its flow rate 60 liters per second. To be verified.
Given these images, a question arises: Are the Japanese preparing to bury the reactors under tens of thousands of cubic meters of concrete?
The problem is not simple. At Chernobyl, the core suddenly went critical (due to "xenon poisoning"), transforming a significant amount of cooling water into hydrogen and oxygen. Above a thousand degrees, this mixture, resulting from the dissociation of water molecules, cannot recombine into steam molecules. When temperatures drop, ultra-fast recombination becomes possible, turning this "stoichiometric" mixture into a powerful explosive. The phenomenon thus involves taking water, imparting energy to it for a certain period (minutes? tens of minutes?), to turn it into a potent explosive that then releases this energy in a thousandth of a second. At Chernobyl, the explosive power was sufficient to launch the 12-ton reinforced concrete lid covering the reactor dozens of meters into the air. It spun and fell at a 45-degree angle, pulverizing a large amount of solid graphite used as a moderator.
All Fukushima reactors were similarly capped by a concrete slab. What about the one on Unit 3?
The core began to sustain combustion of the graphite in the air, and the 25 firefighters who unsuccessfully tried to extinguish this fire with their hoses were all irradiated and died within days. They faced what they believed was merely a simple fire, without any protective equipment.
As the graphite burned, it carried radioactive elements upward. The graphite itself had become highly radioactive. The Russians' priority was therefore to stop this fire at all costs. To do so, they needed to seal the 10-meter-diameter hole through which the reactor core could be seen, sustaining the graphite combustion. This could not be achieved with concrete pumps. The Russians sacrificed 600 helicopter crews, who dumped thousands of tons of sand, boron, and even lead (which then contributed to air pollution) from 200 meters above this gaping maw. All these pilots and mechanics died from the radiation doses they received. But in the urgency, there was no other solution.
When the core was covered, its temperature rose, and the Russians faced a new problem. The core was attacking the concrete and risked contacting another large body of water accumulated in the basement, resulting from the desperate attempts by the unfortunate firefighters, which could itself transform into an explosive, launching the molten core debris not just hundreds of meters, but tens of kilometers or more. Discussions still continue about what might have happened then. But all specialists agree that a second explosion could have rendered much of Europe uninhabitable!
The Russians sacrificed another hundred men, firefighters, to drain this water. But after approaching it via tunnels and creating an opening using a torch, they discovered that the corium magma, after filling this room, had sufficient temperature to attack the next layer of concrete—the final barrier against the groundwater, connected to the Pripyat River, a tributary of the Dnieper, which flows into the closed Black Sea...
Miners, flown in by plane, dug a 140-meter-long tunnel through loose soil at a rate of 13 meters per day, under 50°C temperatures. Then, beneath the reactor, they installed a 30-by-30-meter slab that stopped the magma's descent.
Finally, engineers designed an enormous and costly sarcophagus, a mixture of strong steel beams, concrete, and lead, with an estimated lifespan of 30 years. Efforts are currently underway to raise substantial funds to cap this sarcophagus with a fully metallic vault structure, whose lifespan could then reach a century.
If the Japanese decide on "sarcophagization," how would they proceed? They would need to completely submerge the reactors under a massive concrete block (50,000 cubic meters?). How would they reinforce this concrete and prevent it from cracking due to thermal stresses? All I've found so far is a figure regarding the flow rate of these giant pumps: 200 cubic meters per hour.
I will continue this text by reproducing the official Japanese commission report dated April 4, which admits that no one knows the water level in the reactor vessels; the temperature of the steel containment vessels; or the condition of these various confinement barriers. Indicators (from analysis of the saltwater used for cooling and its isotopic abundance) suggest that corium has spread into spaces beneath some reactor vessels. In what quantity? Where? No one knows.
The director of France's Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety, Mr. Thierry Charles, displaying a calm and rational optimism, not overwhelmed by emotion, seems to have access to information the Japanese officials do not possess. If this is true, it would be urgent for him to share it with them.
April 8, 2011-A:
An unusual glow at the center of Fukushima Unit 3:
This satellite photo of the reactors was taken on April 4, 2011.
In blue, the numbers of the different reactors. The size of the shadows indicates the photo was taken at noon.
Close-up of Unit 3:
The strange glow indicated by the arrow. A second Chernobyl in preparation???
Subsidiary question:
Can you see the armored vehicles, as well as the massive number of technicians and engineers piled around the four reactors?
April 8, 2011-B:
A few days ago, we revealed that the neighboring nuclear plants of Fukushima—Onagawa and Tokai—also situated along the coast with insufficient seismic protection systems—had also been affected by the earthquake and tsunami of March 11. On March 13, the Tokai plant, after a failure in its cooling system, had to resort to auxiliary systems (source). Less than a month after the magnitude 9 earthquake on March 11, 2011, a new magnitude 7.4 quake struck the fault north of Japan. The Onagawa plant was damaged, and leaks were confirmed in the spent fuel storage pools. For memory, these pools contain all the highly radioactive waste from the nuclear plant's operations, sometimes extremely irradiated, as well as previously used fuel rods. Although auxiliary systems maintain the water level in the pools and prevent a consequent temperature rise of this waste, the spread of water outside the pools represents a source of nuclear contamination of the Pacific Ocean and its coasts.
There is a way to attenuate the effects of an earthquake on a "compact" building that isn't a tower. The key lies in extensive ground conditioning work before construction. Thus, stratified ground, like a "layer cake," with successive layers of different materials, produces strong attenuation of the typical horizontal displacements caused by an earthquake.
April 8, 2011-C:
Here we have several images that provide some insight into what is happening at Fukushima. In the days following the earthquake, engineers noticed a significant crack in a pond located in direct contact with port water and connected to Unit 2 reactor.
This is where radioactive water leakage into the sea has been detected.
View of the crack caused by the earthquake. Behind, the wells.
View looking down into the cracked well. At the bottom, electrical cables.
The well has been filled with concrete, waiting for it to seal the cracks.
Click this link to download the English version of the report issued by METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) dated April 6, 2011, titled "Nuclear Emergency in Japan."
Official Japanese Government Report of April 6, 2011
Page 17
We can observe that the water circuit cooling the steam circulating through the turbines and passing through the reactor cores of the various units continues parallel to the coastline (see diagram below):
Apparently, .
Official Japanese Report of April 4, 2011: Cause of Damage
The Japanese had not anticipated that a wave could exceed 10 meters in height. It is highly probable that the diesel generator installations were flooded after the wave passed.
The Japanese requested help from the Americans, who provided a barge to bring fresh water to the site:
The American barge filled with fresh water, being towed
Arrival of the U.S. tugboat and fresh water barge to supply fire trucks: March 31, 2011
The Japanese requested help from the Russians and asked them to send their specialized floating unit for treating liquid effluents, which extracts radioactive components through chemical means. Treatment capacity: 35 cubic meters per day, 7,000 annually.
April 7, 2011:
Things are beginning to become clearer. While AREVA disseminates a PDF stating that the only cause of the reactor explosions was hydrogen explosion in the upper control room (which was indeed the case for Unit 1, left image), even the Japanese, despite censorship and suspicious silence from their (ir)responsible officials, are starting to admit that the explosions at Units 1 and 3 were fundamentally different. The explosion at Unit 3 (right image) could have originated from a criticality event or at least from an explosion originating in lower levels.
Two explosions with entirely different origins
The Unit 3 explosion contradicts AREVA's published report.
A reader living in Japan has indicated the existence of a website, unfortunately in English, that reveals the unthinkable negligence of Japanese nuclear authorities in managing their reactor fleet over the past thirty years (to such an extent that TEMCO had not found an insurance company willing to cover Fukushima's installations!).
Thirty years of deception and lies!
http://fukushimaleaks.wordpress.com
April 5, 2011:
The situation in Japan continues to deteriorate daily. There are significant leaks of highly radioactive water into the Pacific, and attempts to seal these leaks have been futile. Radioactive water is flowing out of Unit 2 and irreversibly entering the ocean. The Japanese government has requested help from Russia, which has faced similar issues with radioactive liquid leaks from nuclear submarines sunk in the Baltic Sea. When Toshiba engineers contacted me (my dossier is read in Japan), I advised them to contact their Russian counterparts, as the similarities between the two accidents were obvious.
Aerial photos are testimony to the scale of the problem. The "pools" store fuel rods corresponding to decades of operation, at an annual refueling rate (...). The earthquake cracked some of these pools, which are losing water, and attempts to seal the cracks using improvised and entirely inadequate methods have failed. In principle, these pools could be emptied and the cracks repaired, but in this case, internal temperatures would rise critically. I recall that in the underground river of Port-Miou (which empties into the Cala near Marseille, named after it), where I scuba dived, we tried to block seawater inflow using special low-density concrete that could set underwater. They asked me to draw plans for the containment wall on-site, accompanied by Bernard Zappoli, then a young student in Marseille (see the CNES-Toulouse scandal, along with his associate from the École Polytechnique, Alain Esterle). Zappoli, who had asked to descend with me, surfaced terrified from that speleo-submarine excursion.
On Monday, April 4, the Japanese began releasing approximately 11,500 tons of highly contaminated water (stored in a large pool filled to the brim!!) directly into the sea, "apologizing to neighboring communities near the nuclear plant." Knowing that eventually this contaminated water would have to be disposed of, it would have been better to transport it via boats, which would then have to be sunk afterward, as they too would be contaminated. There is no need to tow them: an old, small-tonnage tanker would have been more than sufficient to carry the 11,500 tons of contaminated water. The tanker could be piloted from a lead-shielded bridge cabin. Once at deep sea, the ship would be scuttled and the crew airlifted. The contaminated water would remain trapped in the ship's tanks and gradually mix with seawater as the hull and tanks deteriorate.
The fact that Japanese engineers managing this crisis did not consider this alternative demonstrates their lack of vision, incompetence, and inability to handle the situation. It could be said that all their actions are conditioned by the potential public impact, both on their own population and globally. The image of Japan, a high-tech nation, is at risk. Bringing a tanker close to the site to pump out contaminated water could have had disastrous consequences, especially if it were announced that the ship would then be scuttled and the crew would have to pilot it on its final journey protected by lead plates.
The situation is extremely dire. The Japanese meteorological service is under pressure not to release information if winds are directing the radioactive cloud toward major cities "to avoid triggering panic among the population."
If the government has announced that "reactors will be dismantled," a glance at the photos taken by a remote-controlled aircraft (see below) reveals that such dismantling is impossible.
It is also impossible to remove the hundreds of elements stored in the pools.
To do so, they would need to dismantle the upper structures of the reactors. If there were no radioactivity, equipment could dismantle them on-site using torches. But it is impossible. There is no robot capable of remote operation, and there is not enough time to design one.
The only solution is the sarcophagus. It is urgently necessary to pour solid materials over the three reactors to stop radioactive emissions. These are visible as "light fumes," as was the case with Chernobyl's reactor after its spectacular core explosion. But the appearance of these fumes should not mislead about what they contain.
Several videos show light emanating from parts of the destroyed buildings.
Light due to radiation emission from reactor components
It is not surprising that materials emitting radiation create visible luminous phenomena. In the past, radioactive substances were placed on watch hands so their owners could read the time in the dark. If these images had been taken at night by an unmanned aircraft or helicopter, they would have caused panic among the population. They would have reminded people of the sinister glow from Chernobyl's crater rising into the clouds, visible at night.
View of Chernobyl Unit 4 at night, before the crater was filled
Returning to the sarcophagus issue (which would not resolve problems related to potential spread of molten material from the reactor). At Chernobyl, the graphite was burning, and the hole through which radioactive dust particles escaped was about ten meters in diameter. So the Russians sent young pilots of heavy Hind helicopters, with their crews, dumping thousands of cubic meters of sand, concrete, lead, and boron into its throat. Only when this diabolical chimney was sealed did nuclear contamination cease. Performing the same operation at Fukushima would require smothering the reactors with tens or hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of solid materials before gas and solid particles stop escaping.
To do this, the Japanese have brought a concrete dispenser to the site:
Concrete slab construction of a building using a concrete spray lance
The spray lance in action (with water)
But if we tried to build a sarcophagus with such a device, the concrete pouring would be too slow. The flow would be totally insufficient (the inability to assess the problem would become evident when the Japanese sent helicopters to dump water tanks onto the reactors). The Americans would send a similar device by sea, ensuring a higher rate, and adding "that this would be a one-way trip because after use, the device would become too radioactive to be repatriated to the U.S."
Another piece of information, relayed by a contact. A crisis meeting, gathering teams from AREVA and ITER, along with representatives from foreign groups including Germans, took place in Aix-en-Provence on April 4. One participant carried a dossier mentioning a key name:
Godzilla
Nucléoshadock
April 1, 2011:
Although I am very busy writing, in urgency and before finalizing, a second paper for the May issue of Nexus (the first, ten pages, is already in layout. This one will present truly global-scale alternative solutions), I must continue informing my readers about the unfolding drama at Fukushima. This morning, at dawn, I can reproduce a minimal text, which I will expand later today with personal input and images. Here is the text, which I fully endorse and which aligns with the most alarming information I receive from my contacts in Japan. If the author agrees to be cited (I always ask first, I will do so).
Japanese authorities, anticipating the worst and without informing the public, have been stockpiling a gel, dispersed by aircraft, intended to stick radioactive particles to the ground before cleanup by "liquidators," as was done at Chernobyl. It is not impossible that, in case of criticality with significant release, they may need to use this product.
Source:
It is confirmed: fuel rod melting is ongoing and the situation is truly out of control.
The radioactive core in a Fukushima reactor appears to have melted through the bottom of its containment vessel, according to an expert's warning yesterday. Concerns have been raised about radioactive gases that could soon be released into the atmosphere.
Richard Lahey, who was head of reactor safety at General Electric, said workers have now lost their battle. The core has melted through the bottom of its vessel in Unit 2, and part of this substance is now on the floor.
Workers are being paid heavily to try to end this nightmare, exposed to extremely high radiation levels, but it seems their suicidal bravery may prove futile and fatal!
The plant operator hopes to stop the ongoing contamination; otherwise, 130,000 people will be forced to evacuate their homes.
As of today, milk is contaminated, vegetables and drinking water too. Seawater around the plant is also contaminated, not to mention tides that will disperse radioactive elements. Authorities have detected plutonium levels in soil outside the plant. Tunnels connecting Units 1, 2, and 3 are filled with contaminated water at significant levels.
The Japanese Nuclear Safety Agency claims plutonium levels are not dangerous to human health [really?], but confirms the situation is extremely grave and that partial melting is ongoing in at least one reactor.
Engineers continue trying to repair the cooling system, but they are forced to work surrounded by radiation and without electricity.
Florent B.
Friday, April 1, 2001, 2:47 AM
Source:
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/30/japan.daini
/ It's no longer one plant, but two Fukushima nuclear plants that are smoking!
Smoke was spotted at another nuclear plant in northern Japan on Wednesday, according to Tokyo Electric Power.
The company said smoke was detected in the turbine building No. 2 of the reactor plant around 6 PM.
This nuclear plant is located about 10 km from the Fukushima plant.
An evacuation order has been issued for residents living within a 10-km radius of this plant.
Since then, authorities have not provided further comments on the situation.
Florent B.
April 1, 2011:
Iodine-131 has been detected in milk samples from France and the United States, according to simultaneous reports by the French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Analysis results confirm that this radioactive isotope originates from releases at the Fukushima nuclear plant.
Finally, here are high-resolution photos taken on March 20, 2011, by a drone belonging to the private company AIR PHOTO SERVICE. I have not resized the images for screen display, and you may need to scroll for some of them. They show the damage sustained by the reactors at the site and require no commentary. Logically, these photos should have occupied double pages in our major "news magazines." Remember Paris-Match's motto: "The weight of words, the shock of photos." But I'm not sure we'll find such images elsewhere except online. In that case, your opinion will be shaped accordingly.
I am currently writing a second article for the May issue of Nexus, which has opened its columns to me. I will begin with a series of articles illustrating the special issue of Le Point dedicated to nuclear energy.
What you will read in this special issue will astonish you. I summarize:
Pages 58 to 95: Generalities.
Pages 76 to 77: Two pages by Claude Allègre, who claims that fearing seismic effects in France is "walking on one's head."
Pages 96 to 103: A course on different types of reactors, present and "coming."
Page 106: An interview with Robert Klapish, former director of research at CERN.
Robert Klapisch, former director of research at CERN
Everything is fine in the best possible nuclear world
It's so absurd, irresponsible, marked by a complete lack of imagination that I leave it to you to discover by flipping through your local newsstand and reaching this page.
Page 108: Pascal Colombani, former general administrator of the CEA, "demonstrates that we need nuclear energy, but that risks are high." He concludes by saying the Fukushima disaster "will force us to show more imagination."
Page 100: "France, addicted to nuclear energy."
The only alternative is to... reopen our coal mines and reconfigure our port facilities to accommodate foreign coal.
Page 112: "Is there life after the atom?"
Reading this issue, you may realize—unless you already have—that we are governed by fools and managed by dangerous madmen or unconscious irresponsibles.
Solutions exist, and I will present them in the upcoming May Nexus issue. We simply need a bit more imagination than classic ecologists with their de-growth and rooftop solar panels, and instead base ourselves on what works—on proven technologies, not speculative or "will work by 2030" ideas.
We need a plan commensurate with needs and urgency, and I will present it.
Meanwhile, news reaches us that the two neighboring sites of Fukushima have also suffered damage. I will also publish images of the three plants before the disaster, showing all three—installed at sea level, behind a port facility—were backed by large hills nearby. And no one talks about this. It would have sufficed for the private company responsible for installing these reactors to position them a few tens of meters higher to protect them from frequent and powerful tsunamis in this region of Japan. Why wasn't this done?
To preserve shareholder profits and ensure a good return on investment.
April 1, 2011:
Refer to the PDF presenting AREVA's analysis of events.
Let us re-examine certain diagrams trying to understand. This one represents "the control platform" of the reactor. We see the powerful overhead crane capable of lifting the thick concrete lid covering the reactor, in preparation for refueling operations. The railings give scale. After removing the lid, once the reactor's two steel vessels have been depressurized, the entire area is flooded, and then, using the overhead crane, the two steel lids of the system are extracted and placed down. Finally, through the narrow corridor connecting the reactor vessel room and the pool, the fuel assemblies removed from the core are moved, always submerged—these operations being carried out underwater.
Outside the overhead crane, this room is nearly empty. In the background, ventilation ducts are visible. The structure consists of relatively thin steel sheets fixed to a light truss framework. In AREVA's PDF, it explains that when the temperature of the steam inside the reactor vessel exceeded 1000°C and the top of the reactor began emerging from the water, the zirconium in the "rods" containing the fuel pellets—also called "cladding"—decomposed the water. By the way, why zirconium? Because this metal is transparent to neutrons and thus does not interfere with fusion reactions.
The pressure within the 20 cm thick containment structure housing the reactor began to rise. At the same time, hydrogen released from the decomposition of water molecules was detected. Technicians then directed this gas into the control room. Oxygen was fixed through oxidation by the zirconium rods. This process released fuel pellets, mixing them with water and gas, releasing radioactive contaminants.
In this control room, a hydrogen-oxygen mixture formed. Then, as clearly visible in the explosion of reactor number 1, an explosion occurred. The shockwave blew off the steel plates, but the supporting beams remained intact.
AREVA's explanation:
This explanation is consistent with the images we have of reactor 1, but it is completely incompatible with those of other reactors, such as units 3 and 4, where something entirely different and far more serious occurred, affecting levels below the control room floor. Re-examine this image of reactor 3's explosion. Something entirely different happened there.
Unless AREVA produces a new report, its current report completely undermines its own claims.
The increase in radioactivity due to emissions from the Fukushima plant. Le Figaro:
It's not just one plant affected, but three.
The southeastern coast of Japan is particularly vulnerable to tsunamis, bordered by a vast continental shelf descending gently, which amplifies the waves. In this region, two tsunamis reaching magnitude 7 have occurred since 1960. Yet Japanese nuclear operators have systematically built their plants right at sea level, simply constructing a port to transport materials, etc. Look at this map:
Two plants surrounding Fukushima:
Tokaï and Onagawa
Vulnerability: maximum:
120 km northeast of Fukushima:
Onagawa nuclear plant,
feet in the water.
It was hit directly by the tsunami. Waves reached 15 meters high.
A small fire was brought under control. Notice the hills just behind.
Onagawa has three boiling water reactors, the oldest dating from 1980. The town of Onagawa was completely destroyed. As all attention focused on Fukushima, private company Tohoku Electric Power attributed the radioactivity around Onagawa to emissions from Fukushima. But now the population hesitates to believe what they are told. After all, with so many dead and homeless, nuclear power is just another tragedy.
Now let's move south:
Tokaï plant,
also at sea level, backed by hills.
Third private operator: Japanese company JAPC. A 1,000 MW boiling water reactor, commissioned in... 1978, 33 years ago...
The backup pump was successfully activated.
Apparently, I am the only one (I haven't seen this reported anywhere in the press) to suggest that, in a region prone to tsunamis, it would have been far wiser to locate reactors at tens of meters above sea level rather than right at the water's edge. I haven't toured all Japanese nuclear plants, but Fukushima itself also has nearby elevated terrain.
What no one says: At Fukushima, it would have sufficed—at minimum—to place the backup generators and fuel tanks on nearby hills
to protect them from the strongest tsunamis and ensure they could power the electrical pumps.
The Japanese aren't the only ones guilty of stupidity. If ITER ever stumbles, I'll tell you a good one. The reactor will release its contents into nature through a chimney, including deuterium and tritium (radioactive, half-life: 12 years).
In Paris, the Polytechnicians who designed ITER, or the Germans, or others, said to themselves, "Hydrogen, light or heavy, it rises."
Vinon is next to ITER, which I've passed dozens of times. This region, beloved by glider pilots, is ideal for wave soaring, a frequent oscillatory phenomenon here when the wind is strong enough—like the mistral, for example.
Wave regime (meteorology and gliding)
Waves are a glider pilot's delight. The diagram shows where the glider should position itself to take advantage of them. At the crest of gas surges: lens-shaped clouds. Below, a rotor that presses air down to the ground. Air possibly carrying... tritium today.
And what lies downstream from ITER under such a wave regime?
Lake Sainte Croix, Marseille's freshwater reserve.
There is no meteorological service planned within the ITER teams. And if one were needed, it would require a representative from each participating nation.
One day, residents of the PACA region might hear on their media: "Very small amounts of tritium have been found in the lake water, but at a level that poses no danger to people drinking this water..."
To be continued...
March 29, 2011:
A situation of extreme gravity.
On March 28, 2011, André Claude Lacoste, President of the ASN (Nuclear Safety Authority), held a press conference.
André Claude Lacoste, President of the Nuclear Safety Authority
By consulting the ASN website (a government agency that's hard to suspect of anti-nuclear activism), you can read the statement issued by this body. Below is an audio clip sent by a reader, reproducing excerpts from his March 28, 2011 speech.
As you'll notice,
the situation at Fukushima is of extreme gravity
and is taking a very serious turn, even globally. The situation was initially managed in a surreal manner. While such a nuclear accident requires rapid intervention, the Japanese Prime Minister demanded that nothing be done until he could personally fly over the site to assess the situation—despite knowing nothing about nuclear energy.
Moreover, the Japanese politely declined offers of assistance from various countries, out of pride and foolish vanity, "to avoid losing face in front of the world." They refused specialized robots. Today, technicians working on-site must act quickly due to the high ambient radiation levels. Lacoste mentions two minutes. We thus face a situation reminiscent of what occurred at Chernobyl in 1986. Re-watch the film "The Battle of Chernobyl" to recall the extreme gravity of a nuclear accident...
http://cequevousdevezsavoir.com/2011/03/19/la-bataille-de-tchernobyl
I watched a video filmed from a helicopter showing the Fukushima site. It's impressive. Smoke plumes rise from various locations. The Japanese have provided no figures regarding radiation levels at these hotspots. Recall that shortly after the disaster, they announced it was a level 4 event. But the ASN forced them to revise this upward to level 6 (7 for Chernobyl). The probability that the reactor pressure vessels have ruptured and released molten fuel is high. It seems the Japanese are no longer in control of events there. True, they're also dealing with the massive aftermath of an earthquake and tsunami. But who had the idiotic and criminal idea to install reactors right at the water's edge in a region where tsunamis of magnitude 7 have occurred recently (1962 and 2008, I believe)? Check Google Earth and enable the seismic events layer.
At Fukushima, reactor cores likely melted—possibly significantly. At Three Mile Island, USA, 45% of the core had melted, and the "corium" gathered at the bottom of the vessel, which miraculously held.
Three Mile Island reactor, after dismantling, one year later (it's the same type as my Japanese reactors). The shape of this vessel is such that when molten elements fall to the bottom, the geometry causes them to accumulate, increasing the risk of criticality as more of the core melts.
This is why the Japanese are desperately trying to cool these vessels. It's like putting a plaster on a broken leg—retreating to jump further. But if they don't do it, the entire fuel load will melt and gather at the bottom of the vessel. Then the risk of criticality becomes very high. If criticality is reached, the entire corium will flow beneath the vessel into a room filled with water used for cooling. At temperatures well above 1000°C, this corium will rapidly dissociate water molecules. A massive explosive gas mixture—stoichiometric hydrogen-oxygen—will form. The explosion will pulverize the reactor, as happened at Chernobyl, where the 12-ton concrete lid was blasted tens of meters away.
(What exactly happened during the spectacular explosion of reactor number 3, with its gray smoke and concrete fragments the size of bunkers hurled hundreds of meters into the air?)
If such an explosion occurs—and the risk exists—it would result in a massive release of radioactive elements. Consider the amount of fissile material in a reactor, always measured in tons—while a bomb contains only a few kilograms. The dramatic nature of a military nuclear explosion comes from its brevity: a certain amount of energy is released in a fraction of a second (one-thousandth of a second). The shockwave devastates everything in its path. The fireball's heat causes fires and burns living beings. Radiation is also extremely intense. But the pollution—i.e., the amount of radioactive debris falling to the ground—is relatively low, because the immense heat creates an updraft that carries debris high into the atmosphere, where winds disperse them.
In contrast, a nuclear reactor explosion releases far more material because there's no updraft to carry it away. If you watch "The Battle of Chernobyl," you'll see that tens of thousands of people were irradiated by emissions that appeared as barely visible smoke plumes. This was due to the combustion of graphite, sustained by the intense heat from the molten core.
I'd be curious to know the radioactive content of these small smoke or steam plumes rising from the breached plants. There are a thousand ways to measure this—simply dragging a sensor under a helicopter, or sending a remote-controlled drone.
None of this gives me any comfort.
At Chernobyl, the Russians quickly took energetic and dramatic measures to control the situation. After hours of lethargy and disbelief in Moscow, engineers on-site grasped the severity and acted accordingly. Thirty hours after the disaster began, the 45,000 residents of Pripyat, located just 3 km from the plant, were evacuated orderly in 3.5 hours using a thousand buses.
The Russians sacrificed between 600 and 1,000 helicopter pilots to drop bags of sand and boron into the monster's mouth (a ten-meter-wide hole requiring low-altitude approach at just 100 meters). The pilots had to release their loads and were all fatally irradiated.
Only after an enormous amount of sand, concrete, boron, and lead was dumped did emissions cease. But radioactivity from the countless debris continued. Lead vapors also caused numerous health issues in the population. (Just a note: our Polytechnicians, to replace dangerous molten sodium (5,000 tons) used as coolant in fast breeder reactors ("fourth-generation reactors"), suggest cooling the one-ton plutonium core with an equivalent amount of molten lead.)
Where are the Japanese now? It's impossible they can recover their plant units. What will happen? If the vessels leak, radioactive elements will spread throughout the severely damaged buildings. Heat will cause a non-dramatic but increasingly distant release of radioisotopes.
These diverse and varied radioisotopes have already circled the globe. Ultimately, the only solution may be placing the reactors under a sarcophagus, given they are now inaccessible due to extreme radiation. Making this decision would be an admission of failure for the Japanese—not failure in facing this situation, but failure of their technology, energy policy, and way of life. The entire country coexists with 54 nuclear reactors, whose maintenance and design have already faced numerous criticisms. Condemning Fukushima's reactors would trigger a crisis of confidence among the Japanese people, who have no alternative energy resources. The economic, social, and human stakes are enormous.
It's possible that Japanese authorities, who have often demonstrated incompetence and lack of determination, will let things deteriorate to the point where:
-
The situation risks becoming nightmare-like locally.
-
Nuclear pollution reaches a scale damaging to the entire planet.
Regardless, for me, the conclusion is obvious. We must abandon nuclear power and urgently develop alternative energy sources. It's feasible.
It's a matter of human survival.
I'll publish a 10-page article on this subject in the next issue of Nexus, already in production (available in newsstands in May). I'm finishing a follow-up piece to be published in the same issue, identifying
genuine solutions—meaning the implementation of alternative energy sources
on a truly global scale.
It's not about placing solar panels and wind turbines on rooftops and using low-consumption bulbs, but about, for example, harnessing solar energy where it's abundant and transmitting it over long distances via high-voltage direct current. This is not speculation—it's the application of techniques already in use for years in various countries. In Canada, electricity from northern hydroelectric dams is transmitted 1,400 km. Siemens is finishing construction for China of a link connecting the Three Gorges Dam to coastal regions via a direct current connection. Power: 5,000 MW. A submarine cable already transmits 1,000 megawatts from France to England. But the record belongs to the Denmark-Norway link, with 450 km of submarine cable. You'll find all this in my article. We must rapidly tap into the vast reservoir of alternative energy nature provides abundantly. Abandoning nuclear power is imperative. The sooner, the better.
It's not too late—but it's time.
The CRIIRAD detected iodine-131 in Drôme-Ardèche, in rainwater. Here's the link to the video showing Météo-France's animation of radioactive air mass dispersion.
http://www.irsn.fr/FR/popup/Pages/irsn-meteo-france_19mars.aspx
This sequence is eloquent and shows that the radioactive air mass has spread across the entire Northern Hemisphere.
The radioactive air mass carrying dust has already covered the entire Northern Hemisphere.
CRIIRAD's analysis report and commentary dated March 29, 2011
People receive reassuring words about pollution from radioactive elements. Numbers are brandished, described as very moderate or even insignificant. But the main risk lies in inhaling or ingesting dust, followed by its fixation in the body.
This is the major risk:
carrying this radioactive element inside your body.
You can die living in a region where ambient radioactivity seems low, simply because you inhaled a microscopic dusty particle at the wrong moment.
March 14, 2011
For several days now, the world has been stunned, discovering the extent of the damage caused in Japan by the earthquake, and especially the tsunami generated in the Pacific Ocean, some 140 kilometers off Japan's northeastern coast.
An impressive video showing the tsunami
If you want a panoramic view of the damage, watch this Chinese video.
The damage caused in Japan by the tsunami
These images are extremely striking. Here are some samples:
The arrival of the tsunami
An immense whirlpool formed during the retreat of the liquid mass. Notice a boat near the center, appearing tiny.
Fire at a hydrocarbon storage park
Another fire
(stored gas)
Urban fire, city of Sandaï
Filmed from a helicopter, the tsunami surges over Sandaï airport
A portion of Sandaï airport devastated by the tsunami
No comment...
They say "governing is foreseeing." In this case, it means foreseeing consequences—what we might call "secondary" or "collateral" effects—of such a natural disaster. Japan, overpopulated, has 58 nuclear reactors to meet its electricity needs. A nuclear reactor is a thick steel vessel containing fuel rods made of fissile material. Technically, these are tubes called "pencils," packed with fissile elements—mixtures of oxides resembling aspirin tablets.
Compared to an atomic bomb, which behaves like an explosive, a reactor resembles a pile of embers. Inside these rods, the decay of uranium-235, or even a certain percentage of plutonium-239, generates heat and emits neutrons that, striking other uranium-238 atoms, trigger secondary reactions.
To understand how a reactor works, download my comic strip "Energétiquement vôtre" from the Savoir sans Frontières website:
http://www.savoir-sans-frontieres.com
(almost 400 albums of the Anselme Lanturlu adventures, freely downloadable in 36 languages, without media echo, all publishers combined).
A "coolant fluid" must continuously circulate through this vessel—the reactor core—to evacuate the heat produced by fission reactions; otherwise, the worst could happen.
I am not omniscient.
Considering my duty to clarify information and strive to disseminate it, I inform myself often under urgency, sometimes even in haste, when dealing with current events. I do this alongside numerous other activities I must manage simultaneously (I have two new books to write and MHD research to conduct, complex calculations to perform).
I take this opportunity to ask dozens of readers who regularly contact me to join their discussion lists to refrain from doing so. I don't have time for casual exchanges like on a blog. High school students contact me for their TPE projects (same thing: I absolutely don't have time to handle them). Others expect me to answer questions like "Could you explain relativity in simple terms?" or "What do you think of the hollow Earth theory?" Or sometimes, they say, "I'm personally very skeptical about... Could you provide arguments to convince a skeptic like me?" Some, having found interesting websites or videos, just forward their addresses without explanation. If these aren't accompanied by a few lines of context, I don't have the time to explore each one.
Sometimes readers ask me a question and I reply briefly—sometimes simply "I don't know." Occasionally, the interlocutor insists, unable to understand why "a scientist like me doesn't take the time for a proper, reasoned response." Sometimes the exchange ends with an insulting email.
Nevertheless, what I receive daily constitutes irreplaceable documentation. It's thanks to these contributions and clarifications from specialists that I can better equip myself to inform you. Some long-time followers know how to provide me with information, adding a few lines of context or even an image, saying "It seems this is important," and I appreciate it. Others know how to extract key elements from a video document.
When I create a new page, you'll see I don't just list a URL for an article or video. I take many screenshots, compose my own text, and it's common for the assembly of a simple page—where basic tasks accumulate—to take between 6 and 12 hours of work.
In what follows, I will correct what I posted yesterday, hastily, about Japanese reactors, which readers quickly corrected. No, these are not
pressurized water reactors,
but
boiling water reactors.
I provide these clarifications below.
Let's examine the schematic of pressurized water reactors, an American-origin solution predominantly used in France.
At atmospheric pressure, water boils at 100°C. At lower temperature—85°C—at the top of Mont Blanc. Conversely, above 100°C if this water is under pressure greater than one bar.
If heat isn't continuously evacuated, these metal rods can melt (this is "core meltdown"), and the resulting molten material may gather at the bottom of the vessel, forming what must be avoided at all costs: confinement of this material, which would drastically increase energy release due to "criticality."
Indeed, a nuclear reactor is a place where chain reactions occur, which must be carefully controlled. These fissile material rods hang like hams inside the reactor vessel. Around them circulates a fluid that collects heat (water under 150 bars in pressurized water reactors—PWRs). This water enters the vessel at 295°C and exits at 330°C. The flow is massive: 60,000 cubic meters per hour, or
sixteen cubic meters per second.
In this setup, we isolate the primary circuit from the secondary circuit, coupled via a heat exchanger, which then sends steam to a gas turbine driving an electric generator.
In violet: the primary circuit filled with pressurized water circulating within the reactor core. In blue and red: the secondary circuit. In the heat exchanger located inside the reactor containment, this water (dark blue in liquid state) turns into vapor (red). This steam then drives a two-stage gas turbine: high and low pressure. The expanded and cooled steam then passes through a
condenser,
where it liquefies.
A system producing energy has a hot source and a cold source. The hot source is the reactor core's "pencils," bathed in pressurized water where exothermic fission reactions occur. The cold source is the atmospheric air (for reactors using this final cooling system). The first two systems, operating in closed loops, are coupled with a third, in contact with the atmosphere, via massive cooling towers seen flanking French nuclear plants.
Water is made to trickle down the inner walls of these towers, open at the base to allow air circulation. This water thus transfers heat collected in the condenser to the rising air. Along the way, part of the water evaporates (500 liters per second). Therefore, a nearby water supply (river or sea) is required. It's this evaporated water that causes the towers to be crowned with a vapor plume when the reactor is operating.
Thus, 70% of the heat produced escapes into the atmosphere (or into a river or sea if the cold source is of that nature). The efficiency of a reactor does not exceed 30%.
France has 58 pressurized water reactors.
List of French reactors.
Now let's move to
boiling water reactors,
the type used in Japanese plants.
Like you, I'm discovering and trying to explain. The schematic is as follows:
Japanese boiling water reactors (BWRs)
Or "BWR": Boiling Water Reactors
See also:
http://www.laradioactivite.com/fr/site/pages/Reacteurs_REB.htm
Or this interesting English PDF
The comparison with the previous diagram is immediate. There is now only one closed circuit. It's the water sent into the reactor core that vaporizes and is then directed straight to the two-stage gas turbine. On the left (1): the core, within its steel casing. In (2): the fuel elements. In (3): the control rods, which in this setup must rise and cannot fall by gravity in an emergency.
Liquid water (blue) is a better heat conductor than steam (red, at the top of the core).
At the turbine exit, water returning to liquid state in the condenser is shown in violet. There are no cooling towers. Instead,
seawater (gray)
is sent directly into the condenser.
How is a nuclear reactor's activity controlled?
By using
control rods
(for example, made of cadmium) that absorb neutrons without triggering new exothermic nuclear reactions. When these rods are fully lowered (or raised in the case of Japanese setups), the reactor's activity drops by a factor of ten compared to its nominal power. In French reactors, the emergency descent time of the rods by gravity is one second. Twenty seconds in the Chernobyl reactor. The control rods in Japanese reactors rise and are operated electrically via lead screws (see the English PDF—nothing invented here).
Conversely, it's the raising (or lowering in the Japanese setup) of these rods that triggers reactor startup during initial operation. We then say the reactor "diverges."
If any failure occurs in the heat evacuation system from the reactor core, where the rods are located, either a backup pumping system must be activated, or the power output must be drastically reduced by lowering the control rods (or raising them in Japanese setups).
Electricity generation is achieved via
alternators
driven by gas turbines. The steam flowing through these turbines must be transformed back into liquid water in a
condenser.
These condensers are the tall towers seen flanking the reactor building in France. Steam condenses there and is collected at the base of the tower. Part of the water evaporates, with a loss of 500 liters per second.
Such structures are not found with Japanese reactors. Why? Because seawater is used for cooling. For reasons of economy and profitability, the Japanese
installed their reactors near the ocean—a serious mistake in a country whose coasts can be struck by tsunamis.
The placement of Japanese nuclear plants along the coast (...)
I imagine that engineers have studied these facilities in view of a number of risks. All Japanese nuclear reactors are built according to anti-seismic standards. These correspond to a value of 7 on the Richter scale and represent a possibility of horizontal acceleration of one "g." The technique consists of placing the building on what are equivalent to "cylinder-blocks," but much larger.
For information, the seismic shock felt by Japan reached a magnitude of 8.9.
Click on the link. You will see, at the bottom of the page, that an earthquake of magnitude 8.9 can cause damage hundreds of kilometers away from the epicenter. This is exactly what happened—the epicenter being located at the boundary between two tectonic plates, 140 km away.
Roughly speaking, magnitude is a logarithmic measure of an earthquake's power (which must be corrected by taking into account the duration of tremors and the type of waves involved).
By designing their installations for a magnitude of 7, the Japanese underestimated the power of future earthquakes by a factor of eighty (10^1.9).
Surprising fact: this road fractured along its central line.
A reader's explanation: it is common for roads to be "built" in two stages, half at a time, with their central line serving as a fracture initiation point.
I briefly recall the "sufficient reason" behind seismic shocks. On the initial page, tectonic plates were illustrated, which can be compared to ice floes floating on the surface of a river. These plates can overlap. In the case of this Japanese earthquake, it involved the meeting between the Okhotsk and Pacific tectonic plates. The epicenter was located at a depth of 10,000 meters. One of the two plates slides beneath the other (a process known as subduction). These plates are not "lubricated," and this sliding can only occur in jerks. These jerks are the source of earthquakes. When such rearrangement occurs underwater, the uplift of one plate raises a vast mass of liquid. For someone navigating just above this event, this uplift would be imperceptible—it might measure tens of centimeters. But if hundreds of square kilometers of ocean are lifted by 10 cm or more, this represents considerable potential energy, which dissipates as long-wavelength surface waves propagating at very high speed (on the order of a hundred kilometers per hour). When this tsunami approaches a coastline, if the seabed uplift occurs gradually, the wavelength decreases while the amplitude of the water level variation increases. Thus, a wave that represented a 10 cm variation—barely perceptible—originally having a width (wavelength) of ten kilometers, transforms near the coast into a ten-meter-high wave with a wavelength now measured in hundreds of meters. At its closest point, the wave may break.
This earthquake caused the entire tectonic plate carrying Japan to shift by 2.4 meters. This figure should be multiplied by ten near the subduction zone, close to the epicenter. Maps and GPS coordinates need to be revised. This movement affected the entire Earth, causing a 25 cm displacement of the entire crust, resulting in a shortening of the day. This earthquake ranks among the five most powerful ever recorded on Earth since seismic monitoring began.
What caused the failure across the entire Fukushima reactor complex was not the earthquake itself, but the incredible tsunami, with its ten-meter-high wave (something that had never occurred in Japan for hundreds of years). There is no way to protect against such an impact. Those who know the sea understand what storm waves can do. They can burst through seawalls, twist heavy steel reinforcements. About fifty years ago, a man wanted to build near Marseille an attraction he called the "telecable." The principle was that of an underwater cable car. Instead of suspending buckets from a cable, air-filled cabins would be attached to a cable running over pylons anchored to the seabed. The goal was to bring our underwater tourists close to the "Farillons Arch," at the end of the nearby island Maïre—a magnificent underwater landscape I know well. The starting base for the telecable was to be located east of "Cap Croisette."
The small port of Cap Croisette in 1958, a few hundred meters from where the telecable was planned.
The sailors warned the engineer:
- You know, in our region, we have an east wind called the Labé. And when it rages, on certain winter days, the waves are incredibly powerful.
The engineer ignored this warning. The first pylons were installed and were swept away like straw by the first Labé storm the following winter.
I cite this anecdote to illustrate the fantastic power of the sea (water is 800 times denser than air). A reader points out tsunami effects not mentioned in the media. The wave may have triggered sediment movements that could have blocked submerged "intakes" through which seawater for cooling was drawn. Emergency systems, such as water stored in large tanks, might have been disabled by the wave impact. The same applies to backup installations operating on diesel generators.
On the PowerPoint above, you saw the impressive damage caused by the tsunami. If Japanese engineers had designed their facilities with seismic risk in mind, they clearly did not anticipate that the plant could be struck by a wave of such intensity. Even if the most visible buildings managed to withstand it, what about the rest of the installation—the pump room, the control room, the electrical power supply system for the pumps? It would only take one of these components being damaged to prevent the emergency shutdown or cooling of the reactor core. Adding to this aggravating factor: in the Japanese system, control rods cannot fall by gravity but must be raised!
Japanese reactors are designed to respond to seismic activity. The ground tremor preceded the arrival of the tsunami. With the epicenter 140 km from the coast and a propagation time of 20 minutes, the wave traveled this distance at a speed of 300 km/h. Did the reactor safety systems, designed to withstand seismic shocks of magnitude 7, function properly under a tremor approaching magnitude 9? Was the containment structure damaged or cracked?
Japanese authorities tell us these safety measures worked.
Currently (March 14, 2011), we do not know the nature or extent of the damage sustained by the Japanese reactors. The situation appears to be worsening hour by hour. A failure in the cooling system could mean that fuel rods, instead of being submerged in hot water, end up surrounded by steam, whose temperature continues to rise. This steam will then react with the metal forming the cladding of the "rods." This oxidation, by extracting oxygen, releases large amounts of hydrogen and disperses radioactive elements into the steam. In previous days, there was talk of injecting hydrogen to cool the core. It seems this was false. When this hydrogen began to fill the single circuit of the boiling water reactor, engineers had to allow it to escape to prevent the core itself from exploding (...), if that hadn’t already happened. When this hydrogen mixed with air, it caused an explosion, which clearly blew off the roof of one of the buildings—the No. 1 reactor building. I am referring to the first explosion, on Saturday, the day after the tsunami.
Japanese engineers ended up attempting to control the rising core temperature (of the three reactors) by injecting seawater directly—effectively rendering these units unusable due to corrosion.
What still works in these installations? Who could possibly say? It's possible even Japanese engineers don’t know. We saw that control rods must be raised. Can they still be raised now? If the answer is no, it will be impossible to reduce the reactor’s activity level. Furthermore, seawater injected into the core returns carrying radioactivity, which is then released back into the Pacific Ocean...
The major mistake was:
- Building these reactors right on the seashore
- Underestimating the magnitude of future earthquakes (8.9 instead of 7), meaning underestimating destructive power by a factor of 80.
If the nuclear plant's facilities were devastated like the neighborhoods of Sandaï or its airport, welcome to the damage!
There is no way to protect against a tsunami of such power. One cannot imagine building a nuclear reactor and all its installations on stilts. The solution would have been to place these installations above sea level, at a sufficient altitude. Fifteen meters would have sufficed—a simple hill. Yet Japan isn't short of hills: 71% of the country is mountainous. But in that case, using seawater as coolant would have meant losing efficiency due to the power required to pump water with such a high flow rate (sixteen cubic meters per second).
Planning...
A Japanese seismology specialist had vainly, in 2006, emphasized the need to reassess nuclear plant seismic resistance measures.
Link
Professor Ishibashi
Seismologist, Professor at the Urban Safety Research Center, Kobe University
Anyway, in a country sensitive to tsunamis, building all nuclear plants right on the coast was total irresponsibility.
Comparative satellite photos showing the site before and after:
March 16, 2011: There were several explosions. The first blew off the upper part of the building housing reactor No. 1. This appears to have been due to hydrogen accumulation resulting from water decomposition bathing the core elements, with oxygen oxidizing the zirconium metal cladding. The Japanese could not allow pressure to rise in the closed internal circuit or even in the containment structure. So they allowed the hydrogen to rise and enter the space above the reactor. When mixed with air, it exploded, blowing off the roof of that space. This explosion triggered a shockwave followed by condensation of the produced steam—clearly visible on video.
The explosion at No. 3 seems more problematic:
The film shows large concrete fragments being thrown hundreds of meters into the air.
Reactor No. 3 under construction in 1970:
At the bottom, in the foreground, the steel bell sealing the containment structure. Men provide scale.
The core container inside its pear-shaped containment structure.
A reader's opinion:
Here is a diagram of the Fukushima reactors. There is no containment structure in the sense understood in France. The Japanese General Electric BWRs—whether signed GE, Hitachi, or Toshiba—are built by KAJIMA (the Japanese Bouygues) on the same model, resembling Soviet VVR reactors or even Chernobyl-type RBMK: a large concrete mass with a thin steel shed on top.
Atop the concrete block are pools for storing spent fuel rods—both new and old, roughly 20 years of operation, amounting to many megacuries. One can also store the reactor vessel lid, bolts, and anything else emitting radioactivity in these pools. A massive overhead crane is anchored into the concrete, used especially for handling large concrete slabs sealing the reactor well.
Of course, if the core is no longer cooled, the rods melt, react with water, and produce hydrogen. If the vessel is breached, the hydrogen escapes beneath the slab and accumulates in the shed. Voluntary releases should occur through the plant's chimney, of course. If hydrogen has accumulated under the shed, it's clearly against engineers' intentions—because steam pipes were ruptured or even the vessel itself.
The first explosion on Saturday, at reactor No. 1, was clearly a hydrogen detonation: few debris, a clear shockwave, little dust, some metal sheets flying around—this was definitely an explosion under the shed.
At reactor No. 3, the accident was much worse: I believe the core melted through the steel vessel and accumulated at the bottom of the concrete reactor well.
Over time, dripping water caused the corium to form a critical mass. (Corium is the molten core material—a mixture of uranium oxide, plutonium oxide, fission products, steel, and zirconium.) This is known as a "criticality accident" or "nuclear excursion" (a small nuclear explosion, in fact).
I believe the explosion's power shattered the reactor well, and we clearly see massive concrete fragments flying through the air in the videos. Note that the reactor building is nearly 100 meters high—this gives scale to these concrete pieces: the size of a small bunker from the Atlantic Wall!
Pause the video and measure with a ruler the maximum height of the dust and debris cloud: between 600 and 800 meters! Look at the concrete fragments and estimate their size, again using a ruler. Do you still believe the containment structure is intact?
Compared to Chernobyl, the problem is that MOX fuel contains roughly ten times more plutonium. MOX is manufactured in France at the MELOX plant in Chusclan. Its construction was decided by Mr. Jospin.
The Japanese built their own MOX plant, but if I recall correctly, it seems to have been temporarily closed (to verify) after three workers accidentally mixed fissile materials in a bucket too large, irreversibly damaging their cells due to neutron exposure. It's difficult to say whether the fuel in Fukushima reactor No. 3 was produced in France or Japan. We can trust Mr. Besson to clarify this point.
Let’s not boast: under the same circumstances, facing such an explosion, the containment concrete of French nuclear plants would not have fared better.
On the other hand, in French EPR reactors, a "pancake tile" system made of refractory concrete is supposed to spread out the corium to prevent criticality and cool it into a nice radioactive pancake.
Other images of this type of BWR (Boiling Water Reactor):
American-designed. A quarter of the world's reactor fleet. Power: 570 to 1,300 megawatts.
In blue, the "pool" where fuel elements removed from the reactor—now "shut down"—were stored, including a batch of "rods" awaiting replacement.
According to a reader, shutting down a reactor is not immediate, even if control rod insertion stops exothermic fission reactions. These fissions produce elements with a certain half-life that continue generating heat as they decay.
This is why cooling must continue for a reactor "shut down."
The reader estimates the resulting thermal power at 60 megawatts. Thus, even if one of these reactors were "shut down," the failure of the cooling system due to the tsunami impact created a risk of core meltdown. Cooling the core had to be maintained at all costs. Yes, but how?
Description at:
http://www.laradioactivite.com/fr/site/pages/Reacteurs_REB.htm
A dossier in English on safety measures associated with this type of reactor.
The steam temperature is about 300°C and pressure ranges from 70 to 80 atmospheres. Control rods, inserted from below, are pushed by hydraulic rams and therefore cannot fall vertically by gravity. In these reactors, the liquid water level must be continuously monitored. This is achieved using a toroidal-shaped reservoir located at the base of the system.
Between the first cylindrical containment surrounding the core and the second bottle-shaped confinement structure lies (in yellow) an inert gas (argon). A precaution in case rising temperature leads to hydrogen production after water dissociation, with oxygen combining with zirconium cladding. Thus, any produced hydrogen, diluted in a chemically inert gas, cannot cause an explosion (...).
Days and months will pass. The time for assessment will come. It's sad to say, but the fact that this disaster occurred in Japan might influence the global development and redirection of nuclear energy (see below). Chernobyl was 25 years ago. And Ukraine is far away, vast. It doesn't matter that a region as large as Provence had to be evacuated for decades and thousands died at the time, followed by long-term radiation consequences.
If this Japanese nuclear accident had occurred in India, China, or an Eastern country, would anyone care—even if hundreds of thousands died and vast areas were poisoned?
India, China, Eastern countries—far away. And everyone knows these people just... do anything. It's well known. For the world to finally grasp the danger of civilian nuclear energy (let’s not even mention military nuclear energy!), what would it take? Should we wish for the Japanese to experience a Chernobyl II, with a quarter of their densely populated territory becoming uninhabitable for decades, with westward winds requiring immediate evacuation of Tokyo (250 km away) and surrounding populations—30 million people? Should fishing in Japanese waters become problematic due to marine fallout along the coastal zone?
In six months, "everything will be back to normal." "Japan will heal its wounds," they'll say.
Which media raised the key issue: the danger of locating nuclear plants on the seashore—where all are located, making them vulnerable to tsunamis? But if these locations were mistakes, what about the cost of relocating them onto a simple hill? What about the cost of modifying buildings to withstand not magnitude 7 earthquakes but those reaching 9?
There is no zero risk...
Behind this reality lies the negligence of those managing human destiny, the irresponsibility of scientists, the incompetence of politicians and decision-makers, the greed of financial powers, and short-sightedness. In contrast, there's the angelic impracticality of ecologists who imagine solar energy or "economies" and "de-growth" will solve everything. Let me tell you something. Two months ago, the room adjacent to my house—containing the aquagym pool that enabled me to leave my wheelchair and help myself—burned down due to a short circuit. On the walls: plastic paneling over thirty years old. The CES Pailleron in the 19th arrondissement of Paris, where twenty children died within minutes; the 5 à 7 nightclub in Saint-Laurent-du-Pont, Isère, with 180 fatalities—does that ring a bell?
This paneling is not fireproof. But its behavior during a fire is terrifying. When exposed to mere radiant heat, this material decomposes into dark particles forming a toxic mixture rapidly causing suffocation for anyone unable to escape quickly. Yet, when mixed with air, this dust can ignite suddenly. In just ten minutes, flames two meters high emerged from my ground-floor room. I managed to extinguish the immediately violent fire using the garden hose and spraying fine droplets at the top of the flames; otherwise, the house would have burned down. The rapid vaporization cooled the blaze, which disappeared within a minute. I lost some strands of hair.
A piece of advice: if your home or apartment contains this type of thermal or acoustic insulation paneling, replace them immediately with modern, non-combustible materials.
The room has been restored. In passing, I built a one-and-a-half-square-meter solar panel, mounted vertically on the south wall, embedded and disguised as a false window. Since my pool is insulated like a camping cooler—with 8 cm of polyurethane coating, doubled with polyester resin and gel coat, and covered with similar panels—maintaining a constant temperature of 32°C requires only 175 watts. I could thus maintain this temperature using my solar collector (a wooden box, a 1.5 mm steel plate, a copper serpent, a double-glazed pane of 4-6-4, and a circulator). But does this mean I could heat my house, cook meals, etc., thanks to this?
When our well-meaning ecologists call for "new energies," industrialists smile. How would one power industrial installations, run TGVs, produce aluminum, etc.?
See further down
That said, all countries heavily invested in nuclear power plants are now questioning their approach. In France, three-quarters of consumed electricity comes from nuclear sources. We are no less negligent in this regard. If the Japanese plants involved are 40 years old, Fessenheim's plant, at 33 years old, lacks a double containment structure. It would not survive an earthquake. When Super-Phoenix was built, the roof of the pump hall collapsed on December 8, 1990—under the weight of snow!
No one had considered this possibility. Yes, in Isère, it sometimes snows...
In France, we have this absurdity called ITER—a mere "social plan" and dream vacation for thousands of engineers and technicians, aware and complicit, who, before retiring, might admit: "Yes, it was a mistake..."
But what's extraordinary is that two renowned scientists—Balibar and our late Nobel laureate Charpak—while denouncing this ruinous project, costing a pharaonic 1,500 billion euros, simultaneously advocated for the revival of the most dangerous civilian nuclear project mankind has ever imagined: the fast breeder reactor.
Georges Charpak, Nobel Prize winner, deceased September 29, 2010
Just before his death, Charpak, along with Balibar, promoted the installation of fast breeder reactors!
Superphénix, the fast breeder reactor at Creys Malville
(Financial black hole, halted in 1998, currently being dismantled)
On December 8, 1990, the roof of the reactor pump hall—poorly calculated—collapsed under the weight of snow. The designers had forgotten that in Isère, it sometimes snows.
To understand the general principle, refer to my comic strip where all this is explained. Fission reactions produce neutrons. If this occurs in an aqueous environment (pressurized water reactor), water acts as a moderator, slowing down these neutrons.
If we arrange for these neutrons not to be slowed, they can trigger the transmutation of uranium-238 (non-fissile) into plutonium-239 (fissile, not naturally occurring). This is how military reactors produce the explosive material for fission bombs. A fast breeder reactor uses a fertile blanket of U-238, which gradually transforms into Pu-239 over time.
This scheme can be adapted to civilian reactors, carrying significant risks. The coolant fluid can no longer be pressurized water, which slows down neutrons. Instead, one must opt for a design where heat from fission is extracted by circulating molten sodium at 550°C (boiling at 880°C). Sodium does not slow down neutrons. But if released, it spontaneously ignites in air.
In such reactors—called fast breeder reactors—one uses plutonium fission. In a reactor like Superphénix (which is supposed to rise from its ashes), annual consumption approaches one ton of plutonium (compared to 27 tons of uranium at equivalent power). Neutrons from these fission reactions could transform the blanket into Pu-239.
Uranium-238 is the waste product of nuclear reprocessing carried out at La Hague. In a sense, it's the "ash" of uranium-based operation, where isotope 235 is consumed. It's no coincidence that France has become the world champion in "reprocessing," which involves recovering this fraction of "ash" usable in fast breeder reactors. A long-term policy aiming to "ensure our energy independence"—unfortunately... suicidal.
The fast breeder reactor.
In yellow: 5,000 tons of molten sodium heated to 550°C.
Spontaneously ignites upon contact with air and explodes when contacting water (in case of a sodium fire, the last people to call are... firefighters!).
In red, at the core: fuel elements made of plutonium. Around it, in pink: fertile elements—uranium-238—that neutron bombardment transforms into plutonium-239. On the right: heat exchanger system, gas turbine, and contact with the "cold source."
From this perspective, one could say the fast breeder reactor operates by "burning the ashes" from uranium-235 reactors. Since France is very rich in "ashes" due to its uranium-powered reactors and the services it offers neighboring countries in reprocessing, it would thus achieve complete independence in fissile fuel.
The catch is the extreme danger of operating such a reactor.
The core operates at 550°C instead of 300°C. Using molten sodium as coolant poses a major fire risk if it contacts air. Adding to this is the extreme radiotoxicity of plutonium. A tenth of a milligram of inhaled plutonium, settling in the lungs, is sufficient to cause cancer with 100% probability. Do the math. A fast breeder reactor loaded with one ton of plutonium contains enough poison to kill ten billion humans.
The slightest notable incident at a fast breeder reactor could result in ten million victims.
Not ten million irradiated—but ten million dead.
Recommending a shift in French nuclear policy toward fast breeder reactors and complete irresponsibility. That such a recommendation comes from an incompetent politician might be understandable. It's astonishing that it came from a Nobel laureate in physics, who was just days away from death.
But in France, a reactor of this type is once again under study.
Just a note: like other countries, especially Japan, France uses MOX fuel—a mixture—in 20 of its reactors. MOX is a blend of two components: 6 to 7% plutonium diluted in 93% non-fissile uranium-238. Wherever there's plutonium, the situation is never calm (for example, in Japan...).
March 24, 2011:
What is MOX?
Natural uranium exists in oxide form. Two isotopes are present:
- U-238, at 99.3%, non-fissile but fertile
- U-235, at 0.7%, fissile
To use natural ore directly as fuel, one needs the most efficient neutron moderator: heavy water, a molecule composed of deuterium (an isotope of hydrogen). Hence the famous "heavy water battle," during which a commando destroyed an isotope separation plant in Norway, which held a stockpile of heavy water that could have been used by the Nazis. Similarly, Joliot-Curie secured French heavy water during the 1940 French collapse. Such reactors exist in Canada—called CANDU, for Canada Deuterium Uranium. These cannot use heavy water as coolant. Thus, there are automatically two separate systems: one circuit extracting thermal energy and another filled with heavy water moderator.
Hence the term "Light Water Reactors" (pressurized or boiling water), in contrast to these (rare) reactors containing heavy water.
Outside reactors using heavy water as a moderator, preliminary enrichment of uranium ore is required, starting by transforming the oxide into gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6), which is enriched via centrifugation to 3–6% U-235. Then, by assembling masses on the order of hundreds of tons, this fuel can "diverge," meaning it becomes a site for chain reactions producing energy.
If a low-enrichment nuclear fuel is used, the reactor must be larger in volume. Over the years, nuclear engineers have improved core designs. Indeed, in a cylindrical core, fission reaction rates are higher in elements located near the center. Engineers have manipulated the arrangement of assemblies near the axis by placing those from the periphery in their place. They have also adjusted the non-uniform distribution of moderator elements, reducing reactivity at the center to achieve homogeneous fuel depletion across the reactor. Neutron reflectors are also used; these techniques have enabled operation with lower enrichment levels, thus reducing costs.
Military reactors, such as those in submarines and aircraft carriers, require greater compactness and use uranium enriched to higher levels.
Let us say that uranium enriched to 3–20% U-235 remains within the civil nuclear category. From 20% to 90%, we enter the domain of military-grade uranium. With high enrichment percentages, uranium-based atomic bombs become feasible.
However, in general, atomic bombs (A-bombs) are made from plutonium, which requires a smaller critical mass. Plutonium is produced by allowing fast neutrons to escape and bombard a fertile U-238 blanket, according to the reaction:
U-238 + neutron → Pu-239
Thus, there is no clear boundary separating civil from military nuclear technology. If the moderation in a civilian reactor is reduced, it can become plutonium-producing, eventually supplying plutonium for fission bombs. See my comic strip "Energétiquement vôtre," downloadable free of charge on the Savoir sans Frontières website.
Incidentally, under normal operation of a civilian reactor, a small amount of plutonium is produced because the moderator, while reducing the number of fast neutrons, cannot eliminate them entirely. This plutonium, mixed with uranium, thus becomes part of the "waste" from civil nuclear operations.
Returning to fuel: uranium enrichment in France is carried out at the Tricastin center. Consuming electricity generated by three nuclear power plants located on-site (making it EDF’s largest client in France), this center enriches natural uranium ore, which contains only 0.7% U-235. Isotopic enrichment is primarily achieved through cascades of centrifuges. At the end of the process, we obtain:
- Enriched uranium with 3–6% U-235
- A residue known as "depleted uranium," containing 0.2–0.3% U-235, which is used to make penetrator warheads for shells.
See Jean-Luc Piova’s dossier on this subject.
Consider the most common reactors in France—the PWRs (Pressurized Water Reactors). They are loaded with fuel containing 3% U-235. During reactor operation, lasting about one year, the fuel composition evolves over time. Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) is produced, along with various non-extractable fission products. The percentage of U-235 decreases over time. When it drops to 1%, the fuel becomes unusable, as the fissile material density becomes too low. Replacement is then required. Meanwhile, a certain amount of plutonium has been produced via neutron capture. However, this plutonium cannot contribute to energy production through fission under these conditions, where neutrons are slowed down by water—acting both as the coolant fluid and the moderator, i.e., slowing neutrons from 20 km/s to 2 km/s to induce fission in U-235.
At the end of operation, two options exist. Either we store the reactor's spent fuel "as is," which still contains 1% U-235 and 1% plutonium. Or we reprocess it at a reprocessing plant (La Hague), where we separate radioactive waste—unusable and highly toxic—into vitrified blocks, while recovering U-235 and Pu-239, either pure or diluted in higher-concentration U-235, producing again a fissile material.
For decades, the French have opted for "fourth-generation reactors," i.e., fast breeder reactors such as Superphénix. As stated in CEA texts, the question is not whether we will adopt this model, but when we will decide to replace the uranium reactor fleet with fast breeders, which will then be deployed across France.
However, Superphénix, a prototype of these fourth-generation reactors, caused a major scare in 1990. The roof of the hangar housing the turbines collapsed under the weight of snow!
Fortunately, on that day, the reactor was shut down.
Otherwise, we would have had a serious disaster.
This triggered widespread protests, and the reactor was subsequently shut down. In fact, as Balibar and the late Charpak noted, the idea remained alive, and they simply wished for the project to resume.
Some "nuclear barons" (polytechnicians from the "Corps des Mines," entirely part of this vast French network) found a "solution": replace the dangerous sodium coolant with molten lead.
I have enough material to prepare a dossier on Chernobyl, recalling all that happened. Using molten lead does not eliminate the inherent danger posed by the ton of plutonium contained in these fast breeder reactors. If that were the only risk, a nuclear accident would then disperse vaporized lead, which condenses into particles over a vast area. Lead’s boiling point is 1750°C—quickly reached during a nuclear accident (as at Chernobyl).
In addition to plutonium contamination (with a half-life of 24,000 years), you would also face lead contamination (plumbism). Moreover, earthworms quickly bury surface soil to depths of up to 20 cm. Decontamination would then be impossible.
To complete this apocalyptic picture, note that depleted uranium (containing 0.3% U-235 instead of the natural 0.7%) is reused as a material for shells combining high density and strong penetration power. After impact, uranium vaporizes into fine particles that can be inhaled by "the enemy," polluting the soil and causing genetic mutations in their descendants—creating monsters (as seen in Iraq), all to "punish" them.
See Jean-Luc Piova’s dossier on this subject.
Until fast breeders are deployed, France’s nuclear industry has found an intermediate solution by creating MOX fuel, using plutonium produced at La Hague. We can thus create (and sell) a new nuclear fuel composed of U-238, U-235, and 6–7% plutonium. This mixture functions in conventional reactors—pressurized water or boiling water reactors (like Fukushima Unit 3). A minor detail: the core now contains plutonium. And if a nuclear accident occurs, it will not be iodine, cesium, or a range of radioactive contaminants with varying half-lives being released into nature—but plutonium.
Plutonium has a half-life of 24,000 years, which can be considered effectively infinite.
If plutonium ever contaminates a region due to an accident, that pollution will be irreversible.
March 25, 2011: Two remarks regarding reactors using water as coolant. Radiolysis always occurs continuously—i.e., water molecules are dissociated by radiation. This radiolysis can compound the thermal dissociation of water at around 1000°C. At Chernobyl, cooling circuits were blocked at low power due to "xenon-135 poisoning." This chemically inert gas is a fission product. Under normal conditions, it is degraded by neutron flux into cesium (I believe). But if the reactor operates at very low power, neutron flux drops and xenon transmutation can no longer occur. Bubbles form, blocking water circulation—thus halting cooling. Temperature rise deformed the guide tubes for control rods, slowing their descent (20 seconds). The rods could not be inserted. Everything then proceeded rapidly. Water dissociated into a stoichiometric, explosive gas mixture. When enough of this mixture accumulated, it exploded, propelling the 1200-ton concrete reactor lid upward. Falling at a 45° angle, it fractured the reactor—i.e., the graphite moderator block and fuel assemblies. With no cooling circulation, temperature continued to rise. The entire core melted, forming a magma mass at the reactor’s base, without a containment vessel. This mass continued releasing heat, sustaining graphite combustion. Smoke carried all radioactive pollutants away. At the same time, radiation from the core was so intense it ionized the air above the reactor, creating a visible luminous beam at night.
I obtained complete plans of the Japanese reactor and am studying them. The reactor’s bottom, obviously concave, is well-suited to collect molten material if needed. Moreover, control rods are pushed upward by electrically powered screw jacks. Thus, the reactor’s lower part is structured like a sieve. Readers keep asking me: "Why weren’t the rods placed on top, as in other reactors?" This is impossible in boiling water reactors. The upper section is submerged in steam, and space is occupied by drying systems for the steam. I am currently translating the installation plans, with legends in English.
Did the "shutdown" system work for Unit 3? We are surprised by the explosion’s violence. Could there have been radiolysis of a large water mass, followed by an explosion not in the steel structure above the reactor (as in Unit 1), but deep within the system—causing massive concrete fragments to be ejected?
The manual emphasizes the inherent stability of the installation: in these water-cooled reactors, if abnormal reactivity occurs—i.e., if the core emits too many neutrons—the water heats up and expands. This expansion is sufficient to reduce the water’s moderating effect (slowing down neutrons). Fewer slow neutrons result in reduced core activity, since uranium fission occurs more easily with slow neutrons than with fast ones.
The following pages show all safety systems.
One chapter is missing:
What to do in case of earthquake and tsunami?
I find this omission troubling.
The second remark concerns the aging of nuclear installations. Radiation weakens the reactor vessel’s steel over time. When engineers estimate the vessel can no longer withstand pressure, the reactor is deemed at end-of-life.
March 26, 2011: A reader from the CEA sent me the daily report from France’s Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), specifying: "Here are the real facts about the status of the Fukushima site."
This assessment appears less optimistic than that provided by French engineers on-site, commenting on official Japanese information.
IRSN Report, March 25, 2011
Excerpts:
IRSN
Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety
Information Note
Status of Nuclear Installations in Japan Following the Major Earthquake of March 11, 2011
Situation Update at 08:00, March 25
Reactor Status
The IRSN remains highly concerned about the current status of reactors 1, 2, and 3 (risk of equipment failure due to massive salt presence in the vessels and containment, lack of a permanent system capable of removing residual heat...). This precarious situation is expected to last weeks or even months due to the difficulty of the situation.
The IRSN is evaluating possible worsening scenarios, particularly those involving a potential rupture of reactor 3’s vessel. While it will be difficult to confirm such a scenario, the environmental impact of radioactive releases is currently under examination.
Reactor 1
The rate of seawater injection into the vessel has been adjusted (10 m³/h) to control temperature above the core. This flow should allow for residual heat removal. Containment pressure has stabilized. Immediate depressurization of the containment is not expected.
Reactor 2
Seawater injection into the vessel continues to ensure core cooling, though the core remains partially uncovered. The containment may be damaged. The situation has not changed; depressurization of the containment is no longer necessary. Electrical power should be restored to the control room today.
Reactor 3
Seawater injection into the vessel is maintained to ensure core cooling, although the core remains partially uncovered. Containment appears no longer airtight, based on pressure readings; this loss of tightness is likely responsible for continuous, unfiltered radioactive releases into the environment.
Smoke emissions observed on March 23 have ceased. The IRSN is analyzing potential causes of containment failure in reactor 3.
One hypothesis examined by the IRSN involves a possible vessel rupture followed by interaction between the corium (a mixture of molten fuel and metals) and the concrete at the bottom of the containment.
The environmental impact of such a scenario is under evaluation.
Three workers were contaminated on March 24 in the turbine building of reactor 3.
Work to verify equipment has been suspended. These efforts aim to restore freshwater supply to the reactor.
Reactor 4
This reactor’s core contains no fuel.
Reactors 5 and 6
The reactors are properly cooled (core and fuel assemblies in spent fuel pools).
The Japanese engineers’ concern is that salt brought by seawater cooling might block solenoid valves, which can only be operated remotely. A malfunction of this kind could have incalculable consequences, and their priority is to restore freshwater cooling as soon as possible.
So, what is the solution?
I have "hot" information on the Z-machine, directly obtained from two international conferences—Vilnius 2008 and Jeju, Korea, October 2010—and from Malcolm Haines himself. Nexus has agreed to publish the article, which will appear in its next issue. These revelations will simultaneously amplify hopes and fears surrounding this new ultra-high-temperature technology. Without spoiling the topic (the article will be written quickly):
- The Americans indeed achieved 3.7 billion degrees in 2005 at Sandia’s Z-machine. Prioritizing military applications (pure fusion bombs), they have since kept performance details secret. With ZR, current intensity rose from 17 to 26 million amperes, and the device’s performance is now classified.
Go back to the beginning of this page dedicated to the Japanese nuclear disaster.
March 20, 2011: Should we treat this Japanese accident as a serialized drama? There are so many other global catastrophes that it’s hard to know where to begin. What can be said is that this disaster is once again due to human stupidity: building nuclear reactors on the coast (as all Japanese reactors are) in a country periodically devastated by tsunamis. Additionally, constructing cheap reactors to maximize profit. Neglecting recommendations from seismologists who urged stronger safety measures against earthquakes.
Lack of foresight.
The Japanese continue to amaze us with their spectacular robotics advances. In Japan, robots can ride bicycles, speak, and smile. Humanoid robots are being created that look impressive and may one day be sold like artificial pets or electronic companions to lonely city dwellers. This recalls a chapter from Ray Bradbury’s "The Martian Chronicles," which I strongly urge you to read or reread.
But in Japan, no investment was made in safety robots capable of climbing rubble—especially those with lead-shielded electronics able to withstand intense radiation. They had to be imported from abroad.
We saw one of the responsible officials, "overwhelmed by emotion," shed crocodile tears (but he wouldn’t go so far as to sit beside the operators who, risking their lives, approached reactors to cool them). In Japan, political or economic leaders who have ruined hundreds of thousands of ordinary people periodically appear on media to offer public apologies. The head of a nuclear disaster sheds a few tears—replacing the traditional ritual suicide (seppuku).
This video animation shows the layout of waste from a boiling water reactor, handled remotely and stored in a water-filled pool, which acts as a shield absorbing radiation.
You must understand one thing: In the nuclear industry, the highly radioactive and dangerous waste from electricity production is simply stored immediately adjacent to the reactor in basic pools. Water alone suffices as a radiation shield. Only later will this waste be transported to reprocessing centers like La Hague, to extract future fuel for fast breeder reactors. These wastes are far from inert and are as dangerous as the reactor’s core contents.
The spent fuel storage pool.
Located immediately next to the reactor for handling convenience.
A close-up on these "assemblies" grouping "rods":
Each rectangular element ending in a gripping ring is an "assembly."
Zooming in further, we see the "rods," which make up the assemblies. These are zirconium tubes (also called "cladding"), filled with "fuel pellets": uranium oxides, or in the case of MOX, a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides. If the water surrounding these assemblies evaporates, the residual heat from these tightly packed assemblies is sufficient to rapidly damage the zirconium tubes, allowing the pellets to escape and accumulate at the pool’s bottom. Or an explosive event could disperse these materials around the reactor.
60 rods per assembly in Japanese reactors.
Here is the source of what follows:
http://allthingsnuclear.org/tagged/Japan_nuclear
The vessel (here open) and the pool are connected by doors functioning as locks.
Periodically, "the reactor is shut down." Control rods are raised, reducing activity to a minimum—but not zero—because fission products continue evolving and decaying, releasing heat (60 megawatts, one-tenth of nominal operating power). The lock isolating the reactor’s top from the storage pool is opened. Water fills all available space. Handling of assemblies then occurs in water, using a crane and telescopic arm, whether removing "used" assemblies or replacing them with "new" ones. In any case, unless a reprocessing line like La Hague takes over, "spent assemblies" will remain stored in the adjacent pool, continuing to heat the water in the spent fuel storage pool.
Handling of assemblies under a water cover, shielding against radiation.
Here is a photo showing such handling, taken at a reactor in the United States, at the Brown Ferry plant in Alabama.
Transfer of a spent assembly to the storage pool (Alabama)
The term "cattle chute" was chosen due to the resemblance between these bridges and the passages guiding livestock to slaughter.
The photo is taken by the crane operator. Under his feet: water protecting him from radiation.
A few meters below, the blue glow corresponding to radiation effects on water from the "spent" fuel elements is clearly visible. It’s far from inert!!!
Here is another photo of a U.S. reactor storage pool (Alabama), empty before use.
Decades ago, I visited the experimental Pégase pool-type reactor at Cadarache. Looking through the clear water, I could see "all the reactor's guts," surrounded by a blue glow, ten meters below. It was confronting death face to face—the naked nuclear poison. The emitted particles traveled at speeds not exceeding light speed in vacuum, but exceeding it in water, which reduces light speed to 200,000 km/s. The ratio 200,000/300,000 = 1.5 corresponds to water’s refractive index. Thus, particles were emitted at "supersonic speed" relative to light in the medium, clearly producing shockwave-like phenomena—what is known as the Cherenkov effect. In any medium other than vacuum, light propagation time increases due to absorption and re-emission by atoms or molecules. But between atoms, photons travel at 300,000 km/s.
PEGASE (35 thermal megawatts), a research and testing reactor, achieved criticality at Cadarache in 1963—a reactor where tests of fuels for gas-cooled reactors were conducted.
The Pégase reactor pool was converted in 1980 to store 2,703 containers holding 64 kg of plutonium.
Sources for what follows:
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima
http://allthingsnuclear.org/tagged/Japan_nuclear
Each assembly element (see above) weighs 170 kg and contains 60 "rods." The storage pool for reactor 3 contained as many "spent but highly toxic" rods as the reactor core itself.
Below is an image broadcast by NHK, indicating that cooling (using seawater) must be applied at a height of 22 meters.
Cooling Japanese reactors requires pumping water (seawater) to a height of 22 meters (source: NHK television).
The water delivery pole, mounted on a mobile vehicle.
Testing of this water delivery pole.
March 22, 2011: As noted by a reader, this appears to be a remote concrete pouring pole, as indicated by the image he sent me (and I thank him for it):
Indeed, on the left, we see the concrete transport truck with its rotating mixer.
Ahead, a large slab allowing the articulated pole to evenly distribute the concrete.
Of course, such a pole could also deliver water at 22 meters, where cooling would be most effective. But if it were used to flood the reactor with cement, that would be far more serious—indicating that the reactor’s cooling systems, or one of them, had been destroyed.
Let’s wait...
We can only hope for the Japanese that the situation is not as critical as it appears on the nuclear front (aside from the tsunami victims, now exceeding twenty thousand).
Nevertheless, these events abruptly bring us back into contact with the dangers of nuclear energy.
Volunteer translation groups.
Some readers have offered to help disseminate this analysis of the situation (and other pages of this site) by volunteering their services as translators. Some are professional translators or bilingual. But no such level is required to participate. The essential thing is that the information spreads.
For Spanish:
Contact Emilio Lorenzo, researcher at CNRS, who will manage translations and possibly segment pages.
For English:
Several candidates have stepped forward, particularly to translate. This is clearly the most important language, with the greatest potential reach.
I ask these readers to contact each other. If one of them could coordinate the translation effort, possibly segmenting pages.
So far, the following have volunteered:
One has offered to translate part of this page, which I will divide into segments of roughly five pages of text.
Who is willing to coordinate the English translations?
April 9: Agreement to translate into English:
For Italian:
Go back to the beginning of the page dedicated to the Japanese nuclear disaster.